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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Models of dual economies have become a familiar part of development economics
and the theory of international trade. Often, theoretical analysis is based upon
a2x2m o d e lw i t ht w os e c t o r sa n dt w of a c t o r s ,i nw h i c ht h e r ei sad i ﬀerential
in factor returns across sectors. A number of potential eﬀects have been identi-
￿ed, together with policy measures that could eliminate dualism. Yet we know
remarkably little about the likely magnitude of the various eﬀects, or the gains
to be expected from policy intervention.1 In other words, previous research has
largely failed to address one of the most important questions: how signi￿cant
are the costs of dualism?
This paper seeks to answer that question, by quantifying the costs along a
number of dimensions. The paper examines the eﬀects of dualism on aggregate
output, sectoral structure, wages and returns to capital, and the distribution of
factor income. One of the most striking ￿ndings is that labor market rigidity
can have a major impact on sectoral structure - in other words, on the extent
of industrialization.
The paper also makes a methodological contribution. The paper shows how
to calibrate a two sector general equilibrium model of production, in a way that
is undemanding in terms of both data requirements and parameter assumptions.
Among other things, the paper describes assumptions under which technology
parameters and the intersectoral allocation of capital can be recovered from
data on sectoral output and employment shares. As I will discuss below, these
ideas have wider application, since general equilibrium models of production are
relevant in a variety of ￿elds.
Here the calibration technique is applied to labor market rigidity and its
consequences. It is well known that the marginal product of labor is likely to
diﬀer across sectors in countries at an early stage of development. The paper
considers the eﬀects of one speci￿cf o r mo fw a g ed i ﬀerential, namely that between
a modern urban sector and a rural agricultural sector. This is often thought to
be one of the most important of the possible distortions in developing country
labor markets (Rosenzweig 1988, p. 751).
A natural starting point for the analysis of wage diﬀerentials is the framework
of Harris and Todaro (1970). There are two key assumptions, to be discussed
at greater length later in the paper. First, an exogenously ￿xed wage in the
urban sector implies that the urban labor market fails to clear, leading to ur-
ban unemployment. Second, intersectoral migration takes place unless expected
1See for example Freeman (1992, 1993), who argues that not enough is known about the
magnitude of the distortions associated with labor market imperfections.
2wages are equal in the urban and rural sectors. Since it is expected wages which
are equalized, rather than actual, there will be an intersectoral wage diﬀeren-
tial in equilibrium. The wage diﬀerential will be related to the extent of urban
unemployment.
The paper calibrates a model of this general form, based on the version of
the Harris-Todaro model introduced by Corden and Findlay (1975). Although
the calibrated model is stylized, its simplicity has considerable advantages. The
calibration exercise requires, somewhat remarkably, only data on agricultural
output and employment shares, and assumptions about three parameters: the
elasticity of substitution in production, the share of labor in national income,
and the urban unemployment rate. As a result, the calibration is simple to
carry out, the underlying assumptions are readily understood, and results can
easily be communicated for a variety of cases. Perhaps more importantly, the
simplicity of the model also allows the results to be understood and interpreted
using existing trade theory, and casts some light on the quantitative importance
of various eﬀects identi￿ed by theorists. Hence the analysis provides a useful
complement to more detailed computable general equilibrium (CGE) models,
although admittedly at a signi￿cant cost in terms of realism.
The calibrated model is used to compare the outcomes under dualism with
the ￿rst-best allocation, in which there is no unemployment and the marginal
product of labor is equal across sectors. In line with most previous work, the re-
sults indicate that the impact of wage diﬀerentials on aggregate output is limited,
especially if the elasticity of substitution in production is low. Furthermore, for
the cases considered here, the movement from dualism to the ￿rst-best is asso-
ciated with higher returns to capital but lower wages in both sectors, especially
in non-agriculture.2 Perhaps more importantly, dualism has important conse-
quences for sectoral structure. Large shifts in the relative importance of the two
sectors are possible in moving from the dualistic economy to the ￿rst-best. To
put this in slightly more colourful terms, where we observe that a country has
not industrialized, this paper shows that the nature of the urban labor market
is a possible explanation.3
The general form of approach is related to a number of previous contribu-
tions. Johnson (1966) also studied the eﬀects of factor market distortions in gen-
eral equilibrium. He argued that the eﬀects of diﬀerentials on aggregate output
2The result that wages are lower in both sectors in the ￿rst-best may seem surprising, but
is in line with previous theoretical work. This point will be discussed later in the paper.
3In this respect, the paper supports the arguments of Ag· enor (1996) and Freeman (1992),
that more research on the connections between labor market imperfections and economic
growth could be fruitful.
3are probably limited, based on visual inspection of production possibility fron-
tiers drawn for the Cobb-Douglas case. Since then, the issue has been revisited
under more general assumptions. Prominent examples include Dougherty and
Selowsky (1973), de Melo (1977), and Williamson (1987, 1989). These papers
tend to focus on the output eﬀects of eliminating wage diﬀerentials for speci￿c
countries or historical cases. My work diﬀers in considering a wider range of
possible scenarios, and in giving more emphasis to the impact of dualism on
wages and returns to capital, the distribution of factor income, and particularly
sectoral structure, issues which have received relatively little attention in the
literature thus far.
As noted earlier, the paper is also innovative in developing a calibration
method that could easily be applied to a large number of countries, and oﬀer
insight into a range of other issues. Jones (1965) pointed out that simple general
equilibrium models of production have not only been a workhorse of trade theory,
but have also found applications in almost all branches of applied economics.
The simple 2 x 2 model has long been left behind in the applied literature on
international trade, but is still of interest in other areas, notably the study of
economic growth and structural change. It would be a simple matter to extend
the approach of this paper to analyze such questions, and to cast more light on
various properties of the canonical 2 x 2 model.
The paper also casts indirect light on the eﬀects of minimum wage legislation,
when the coverage of such legislation is incomplete. In the analysis of this paper,
the sectors are labelled ￿agriculture￿ and ￿modern￿. The two sectors could be
labelled more generally as ￿uncovered￿ and ￿covered￿ respectively, as in the work
of Mincer (1976) and Fields (1997) on minimum wages. Under this alternative
interpretation of the paper, the analysis quanti￿es the eﬀects of a sector-speci￿c
minimum wage on output and wages, and reveals the consequences of eliminating
such controls. Hence the analysis of the paper has relevance and interest beyond
the speci￿c application I emphasize, which is to labor markets in developing
countries.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets out the general model,
de￿ning both the ￿rst-best allocation and the dualistic one, and showing how
the transition between the two may be understood using trade theory. Section
3 introduces the strategy for calibrating the model, starting with the relatively
simple case where the sectoral production functions are Cobb-Douglas, and then
turning to the more general case of CES production functions. Section 4 de-
scribes the data and assumptions. Section 5 reports the calibration results and
uses them to compare the dual economy with the ￿rst-best allocation. Section
46 provides some further discussion, before section 7 concludes.
2 A model of dualism
This section describes a simple general equilibrium model of a dual economy,
essentially the version of Harris and Todaro (1970) due to Corden and Findlay
(1975). There are two sectors, rural agriculture and an urban ￿modern￿ sector.
The agricultural good is the numeraire. I make the standard simplifying as-
sumption that both goods are traded on world markets, and the economy is too
small to be able to in￿uence world prices. Hence the relative price of manufac-
tures, p, is exogenously ￿xed by world prices. Appropriate choice of units would
allow this price to be normalized to one in the equations that follow, but I prefer
t ok e e pt h er o l ef o rt h er e l a t i v ep r i c ee x p l i c i t .
Aggregate output, capital and labor are denoted Y , K and L respectively. As
is standard in general equilibrium models of production, the economy is closed
to international ￿ows of capital and labor, and the aggregate capital stock and
labor supply are taken to be exogenously ￿xed.
The technologies in the two sectors are:
Ya = AaF(Ka,L a)( 1)
Ym = AmG(Km,L m)( 2 )
where Yi, Ai, Ki and Li are output, TFP, capital and labor in sector i
(agriculture/modern) respectively. Returns to scale are constant in both sectors,
and both factors are paid their marginal products.
Capital is fully employed, so that
K = Ka + Km (3)
I assume that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors, so that rental rates
are equalized:
AaFK = pAmGK (4)
where the subscript K denotes the derivative with respect to capital.
I assume that parameter values are such that specialization is incomplete.
Then, the ￿rst-best equilibrium is described by equations (1)-(4) and the follow-
ing four equations:
wa = AaFL (5)
5wm = pAmGL (6)
L = La + Lm (7)
wm = wa (8)
where the subscript L denotes the derivative with respect to labor. These
equations represent the equality of wages and marginal products, full employ-
ment of labor, and a long-run migration equilibrium in which any intersectoral
wage diﬀerential is eliminated.
The paper will compare this ￿rst-best equilibrium with a dualistic one. The
dualistic equilibrium is again described by equations (1)-(6) but diﬀers in its
speci￿cation of the labor market, which follows Harris and Todaro (1970). I
assume that the urban wage is ￿xed above the market-clearing wage that would
hold in the ￿rst-best equilibrium. This results in unemployment in the urban
sector, so (7) is replaced by:
L = La + Lm + Lu (9)
where Lu is urban unemployment.
The model is completed by specifying the migration equilibrium condition. I
assume that the unemployed receive no income. Migration takes place between
sectors unless the agricultural wage (wa) is equal to the expected wage in the
modern sector, which is a function of both the ￿xed modern sector wage (wm)
and the probability of ￿nding employment at this wage. Assuming that jobs
are allocated by a lottery among the urban population, this probability is 1−u
where u = Lu/(Lu+Lm) is the rate of urban unemployment.4 Note the standard
Harris-Todaro assumption that workers must be present in urban areas to have
a chance of ￿nding urban employment. If we interpret the model in terms of
￿covered￿ and ￿uncovered￿ sectors, the corresponding assumption is that workers
cannot look for work in the covered sector while holding a job in the uncovered
sector.
Labor market equilibrium occurs when:
wa =( 1 − u)wm (10)
This is the equilibrium condition associated with Harris and Todaro (1970).
The model described by (1)-(6), (9) and (10) is the version of the Harris-Todaro
model introduced by Corden and Findlay (1975). It combines the standard 2 x
2 model of trade theory with the Harris-Todaro labor market assumptions.
4The lottery assumption could be relaxed as in Moene (1988). The Harris-Todaro equilib-
rium condition will then be a good approximation provided that the rate of job turnover is
high or the discount rate is low.
6Note that one immediate implication of the Harris-Todaro condition is a
wage diﬀerential across sectors: the ratio of marginal products wm/wa is equal
to 1/(1 − u). Hence output is lower than in the ￿rst-best for two reasons.
First, because some of the labor force are unemployed, and second, because the
marginal products of labor are not equalized for those who are employed.
With this in mind, I introduce a new device for analyzing the nature of the
Harris-Todaro economy relative to the ￿rst-best allocation. The idea is to make
use of theoretical work based on the case of exogenous wage diﬀerentials, as in
the classic analyses of Jones (1971)a n dM a g e e( 1973, 1976). These models diﬀer
from the Harris-Todaro approach in assuming full employment. A common form
of such models can be described by equations (1)-(7) together with a ￿xed wage
diﬀerential:
wm = kwa
How can we make use of existing results for such models? The movement
from the Harris-Todaro economy to the ￿rst-best can be thought of as occurring
in two stages, both of which can be understood individually using trade theory.
The trick is to construct an arti￿cial economy that forms an intermediate stage
between the Harris-Todaro economy and the ￿rst-best. In the ￿rst stage, moving
from the Harris-Todaro to the intermediate economy, we keep total employment
￿xed. All those currently employed are reallocated so that the marginal products
of labor and capital are equalized across the two sectors. In the second stage, we
then complete the move to the overall ￿rst-best by increasing total employment,
by the number of unemployed in the original Harris-Todaro economy. This brings
us to the ￿rst-best, with no unemployment and once again marginal products
of labor that are equalized across the two sectors.
Analytically, the ￿rst stage is equivalent to the elimination of a wage diﬀer-
ential in a model with an exogenous diﬀerential, given by k = 1/(1 − u), and
in which employment is ￿xed. Hence standard results for the exogenous wage
diﬀerential case, such as those of Jones (1971), can be applied to analyze the ￿rst
stage. One result worth noting is that, at constant commodity prices, a higher
premium paid to labor in the modern sector can sometimes be associated with
an increase in that sector￿s relative output. Another result, more important
t ot h ea n a l y s i sb e l o w ,i st h a ti fl a b o r ￿ ss h a r eo fi n c o m ei sl o w e ri nt h em o d e r n
sector than in agriculture, a rise in the wage premium in the modern sector will
be associated with higher wages in both sectors (Jones 1971, p. 442). This sug-
gests that dualism may be associated with higher wages than in the ￿rst-best,
a potential outcome to be con￿rmed below.
Now consider the second stage of the transition to the ￿rst-best, namely the
7elimination of unemployment, starting from the intermediate point where the
returns to both factors are equal across sectors. The movement to the ￿rst-best
is now just an increase in the labor force in an otherwise conventional 2 x 2
trade model with intersectoral factor mobility. In other words, it can be seen as
a change in relative factor abundance which can be analyzed using the standard
results of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. At constant commodity prices, the rise
in employment will have no eﬀect on factor prices, provided the economy remains
incompletely specialized. The fall in the aggregate capital-labor ratio does give
rise to a Rybczynski eﬀect: with the capital stock ￿xed, it yields an increase in
the output of the labor-intensive sector (here, agriculture) and a reduction in
the output of the capital-intensive sector (non-agriculture).
I will adopt the analytical device of a two-stage transition in presenting the
calibration results because, as seen above, it allows me to explain and interpret
the overall ￿ndings using existing trade theory. By analyzing separately the ef-
fects of eliminating the wage diﬀerential holding employment constant, and then
of increasing total employment, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of
how the ￿rst-best outcomes are related to those under dualism.
Note that, from the analysis above, the introduction of an exogenously ￿xed
wage in the urban sector can be associated with an increase in modern sector
output. This paradoxical result for the 2 x 2 Harris-Todaro model was ￿rst
pointed out by Corden and Findlay (1975, p. 66-67) using diﬀerent reasoning,
and has recently been emphasized by Allen (2001, p. 524). One contribution
of the calibration exercise below, however, will be to show that this case is
empirically unlikely.
Before progressing further, I brie￿y discuss some limitations of the approach
adopted here. As with any stylized model, the Harris-Todaro framework is not
without its critics. A clear drawback in this context is that the rigidity of the
urban wage is assumed rather than modelled. Some recent contributions, no-
tably Moene (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), have analyzed models
in which the urban wage is endogenously determined. Both these papers work
with relatively simple representations of the production technologies in the two
sectors, however. Combining their speci￿cations for the labor market with more
complex technologies would not be straightforward. Perhaps more importantly,
the use of such a model would make it harder to relate the ￿ndings to existing
t r a d et h e o r y ,a n dh a r d e rt os h e dn e wl i g h to ns o m eo ft h ee ﬀects identi￿ed by
trade theorists.
The model used here is stylized in other respects as well. Recent work on
migration by Stark (1991) and others emphasizes that migration decisions are
8often collective and made in the interests of a household. Among the impor-
tant real-world considerations I abstract from the potentially substantial share
of rural household income gained in the non-agricultural sector, and the ￿ow
of resources between members of households divided between urban and rural
areas, or more general forms of household income sharing.
Although these considerations could be integrated into the model, the present
framework allows some interesting results to be derived in a way that is both
simple and transparent. The simplicity of the framework allows a clear focus
on the essential aspects of the present analysis, namely the existence of urban
unemployment and a wage diﬀerential. Incidentally, although relating these two
using the Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition simpli￿es some of the algebra, it
is by no means crucial to the results. What the paper has to say about the
aggregate costs of wage diﬀerentials is of interest even though wage gaps in the
real world are rarely well described by the Harris-Todaro condition.
3C a l i b r a t i n g t h e m o d e l
To take the Harris-Todaro model to the data, I assume that observed shares of
agriculture in employment and output correspond to a Harris-Todaro equilib-
rium. The assumption that we observe the world in equilibrium is a strong one,
but it is typical to most exercises in calibration or CGE modelling, and avoids
imposing an arbitrary extent of disequilibrium.
Once the equilibrium assumption has been made, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to derive the nature of the ￿rst-best allocation, in which urban unemploy-
ment and marginal product diﬀerentials are eliminated. Recall that the main
aim of the paper is to compare these two alternative equilibria, and therefore
oﬀer some insight into the costs of dualism.
The remainder of this section describes how to derive the ￿rst-best allocation,
given the observed data. I start with the relatively simple Cobb-Douglas case
to illustrate the basic ideas, before turning to the more complicated model with







I will denote the agricultural employment share (La/L)b ya and the output
share (Ya/Y)b ys. Modern sector employment is given by:
Lm =( 1 − u)(1 − a)L (11)
9Denote the share of labor in agricultural income by ηa = waLa/Ya and in





Using (10) and (11), this expression can be simpli￿ed to η = waL/Y . Hence















Given that the agricultural production function is Cobb-Douglas, the agri-
cultural technology parameter α will be given by




Similarly we can also derive an expression for the labor share in the modern
sector, and hence the modern sector technology parameter θ:






Hence with two Cobb-Douglas production functions, constant returns to
scale, and intersectoral factor mobility, we can infer the technology parame-
ters using only an assumption about the aggregate labor share (η) and readily
available data on the agricultural employment share (a) and output share (s).





=( 1 − u)wm =
(1 − u)p(1 − θ)Ym
(1 − u)(1 − a)L














Using (15) combined with the production functions, it is possible to derive
a ne q u a t i o nw h i c ht i e sd o w nt h eu r b a nu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eu in terms of a, α,
θ, p, Aa, Am, Ka and Km. However, I will assume throughout that we do not
know the last ￿ve variables, so that it is better to work instead with an assumed
v a l u ef o rt h eu r b a nu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ,u. I will now show that using only
data on a and s, and assumptions about u and η, it is possible to calculate the
agricultural employment share in the ￿rst-best economy, denoted b.
10In the ￿rst-best economy, workers will be paid the same in each sector. Thus
w ec a nd e r i v ea ne q u a t i o nc o r r e s p o n d i n gt o( 15), where Y 0
a and Y 0
m are sectoral
outputs under the ￿rst-best allocation, and r is the agricultural share of output
















In the Harris-Todaro economy, denote the proportion of capital used in agri-
culture by x = Ka/K, and the proportion in manufacturing by (1−x). For the
￿rst-best economy, denote this proportion by z.


















pAm(1 − x)θKθ(1 − a)1−θ(1 − u)1−θL1−θ (18)
By dividing (17) by (18), and then using (15) and (16), it is possible to derive














(1 − u)1−θ = 1 (19)













































where b is the agricultural share of employment in the ￿rst-best economy.

































































Hence equation (23) yields the agricultural share of employment in the ￿rst-
best economy, assuming that an observed economy is in a Harris-Todaro equi-
librium.
It would also be useful to know the ratio of output in the ￿rst-best economy to
that in the Harris-Todaro economy, which I denote by ΛY . Given that commodity
prices are exogenously ￿xed, the ratio is given by the ratio of nominal outputs:
ΛY =
Y 0
a + pY 0
m
Ya + pYm















































































Overall, the key equations are (13), (14), (23) and (25). These equations
allow us to calculate the agriculture share in the ￿rst-best economy, and the
ratio of output in the ￿rst-best economy to that in the dual economy, using only
information on the four variables u, a, s,a n dη.
Note that if θ > α then b<afrom inspection of (22). In other words,
agricultural employment is lower in the ￿rst-best economy than in the dual
economy, if the modern sector is relatively capital intensive. This is consistent
with Corden and Findlay (1975), who show that in general the outcome is deter-
mined by the ￿manufacturing elasticity￿, the proportional change in labor input
in manufacturing divided by the proportional change in marginal product. For
the Cobb-Douglas case, this elasticity is greater than one. Corden and Find-
lay show that, as found here, agricultural employment will then be higher in the
12dual economy than in the ￿rst-best, provided that the modern sector is relatively
capital intensive.
Although the Cobb-Douglas case is an easy one to handle, it is clear that the
results are likely to be insuﬃciently general. Compared to the dual economy,
output is higher in the ￿rst-best because extra labor is brought into employ-
ment, and because labor is reallocated between agriculture and non-agriculture.
Clearly the elasticities of substitution between capital and labor in the two sec-
tors will be key parameters governing this process. As Dougherty and Selowsky
(1973) point out, the higher the elasticity of substitution, the larger the gain from
labor reallocation, because the marginal product of labor changes more slowly
as labor is reallocated. This suggests that it would be useful to experiment with
diﬀerent elasticities of substitution.
The simplest way to do this is to follow Kelley et al. (1972) and work
with CES production functions. To keep the model tractable, I impose the
restriction that the elasticity of substitution is the same in both sectors. Hence















where the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1+ρ). As before, I use b = L0
a/L
to denote the proportion of employment in agriculture, r = Y 0
a/Y the share
of agriculture in output and z = K0
a/K the proportion of capital employed in




￿rst-best levels of output, capital and labor in the modern sector respectively. In
the ￿rst-best, the share of labor in national income is denoted φ,a n dt h es h a r e s
of labor income in agricultural and modern sector value added are denoted φa
and φm respectively.
Appendix 1 shows how to derive two equations in terms of b, z and observable
variables, which can then be solved for the ￿rst-best allocation of employment































































13Hence the calibration procedure is as follows. Three parameters have to be
chosen: the aggregate labor share η, the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1+ ρ)
and the urban unemployment rate u. We can then use data on agriculture￿s
share of employment (a)a n do u t p u t( s) to solve for the share of agricultural
capital in total capital, x, in the dualistic economy. Given a solution for x,w e
can then solve the two equations (26) and (27) numerically for b and z.T h u s
using only data or assumptions on a, s, η, u,a n dσ, it is possible to derive what
agriculture￿s share of employment in the ￿rst-best economy (b)w o u l db e .I ti s
then possible to calculate the ratio of output in the ￿rst-best economy to that
in the Harris-Todaro economy, and other relevant outcomes, using the further
equations derived in Appendix 1.
4 Data and assumptions
This section describes the data and assumptions that will be needed in the cali-
bration exercise. I consider three diﬀerent cases for the agricultural output and
employment shares, based on data from three regional groupings of developing
countries. The regions are sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin America.
Grouping countries by region is potentially useful given that technology param-
eters may vary with geographic location. Perhaps more importantly, the three
groups diﬀer in terms of their level of development and the extent of industrial-
ization.
In calibrating the model, one important consideration is the choice of labor￿s
income share (η). Evidence from developed countries tends to suggest that the
labor share is roughly in the range 0.60 to 0.70. It is sometimes argued that
the share may be lower in developing countries (see for instance Collins and
Bosworth 1996). From a pragmatic point of view, a lower value for η is useful
here because it makes the sectoral labor shares (ηa and ηm) more likely to be
less than one, as is clear from equation (12). Accordingly, in what follows I set
η =0 .50.
Next, I choose values for a and s for each of the three regional groups. Table 1
shows the median agricultural output and employment shares for 1960 and 1985
for these groups. The data are taken from the World Bank, and the samples
exclude small countries, de￿ned as those with a labor force lower than 250,000
in 1985.5 Based on these data, I calibrate the model for a typical country in
5The data are taken from the World Development Indicators CD-Rom. Where necessary,
the WDI data are supplemented by ￿gures from the 1990 Production Yearbook of the Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the 1987 World Development
Report.
14each regional grouping using the following values. The agricultural employment
and output shares, a and s, are assumed equal to 0.80 and 0.50 respectively for
sub-Saharan Africa, 0.65 and 0.35 for East Asia, and 0.50 and 0.30 for Latin
America.
These choices depart slightly from those suggested by Table 1,i no r d e rt o
ensure that the implied labor shares (ηa and ηm)a r el e s st h a no n e . G i v e n
that these departures are required, this is evidence that the model does not well
approximate reality for all observed combinations of a and s.T h i si sp e r h a p sn o t
wholly surprising, given the highly stylized nature of the model. Nevertheless,
the results are still likely to be of some interest, not least because there is an
obvious case for understanding the costs of dualism in a simple framework before
moving to the analysis of more complex and realistic models.
Table 1
Agricultural employment and output shares in 1960 and 1985
as
Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 0.86 0.47
1985 0.75 0.34
East Asia 1960 0.63 0.29
1985 0.41 0.18
L a t i nA m e r i c aa n dt h eC a r i b b e a n 1960 0.52 0.23
1985 0.30 0.13
Notes
The variable ￿a￿ is the share of agricultural employment in total employment
and ￿s￿ is the agricultural output share.
Another key assumption concerns the urban unemployment rate. To gain
some idea about appropriate magnitudes, I have calculated ￿gures based on
the ILO￿s Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1995. Agricultural or rural areas are
often not represented in these unemployment statistics, and this suggests that
it is indeed valid to assume that all the reported unemployment is in the urban
sector. This allows the derivation of an urban unemployment rate u = U/(1−a)
using data on the national unemployment rate (U) and the agricultural share of
employment a.
The calculated urban unemployment rates (not reported) vary between zero
and about 35%. The ￿gures for Africa are very low, but are not based on labor
force surveys, and are therefore likely to be inaccurate. This is particularly so
given the ambiguity surrounding the concept of unemployment in developing
countries. For instance, the World Bank (1995, p. 28) reports that in Ghana
t h em e a s u r e dr a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ti s1.6%, but the underemployment rate is
15calculated to be about 24%. Knight (1998) writes that ￿on sensible de￿nitions
the open unemployment rate probably now exceeds a quarter in Zimbabwe and a
third in South Africa￿ (p. 11). Elsewhere in the world, an urban unemployment
rate between 20% and 30% is calculated for such countries as El Salvador, India,
and Sri Lanka.
With all this in mind, I calibrate the model for an urban unemployment rate
of 30%. Another way to judge this assumption is to look at the implied wage
diﬀerential. An urban unemployment rate of 30% corresponds to a marginal
product of labor around 40% higher in the modern sector than in agriculture,
given that we have
wm/wa = 1/(1 − u)
= 1/(1 − 0.3) ≈ 1.4
It is important to emphasize that a marginal product diﬀerential of this
magnitude is not implausible. Squire (1981,p . 102) cites evidence implying
that the nominal wage gap for unskilled labor, unadjusted for diﬀerences in
the cost of living between urban and rural areas, can easily be this large. For
his sample of twenty-three developing countries the median diﬀerential is 34%.
Squire comments, based on data in Clark (1957), that these ￿gures are not out
of line with wage gaps observed for seven developed countries in the second half
of the nineteenth century. Similarly Williamson (1987) argues that rural-urban
real wage gaps in England during the Industrial Revolution were of the order
of 30%-50%. Figures from the World Bank (1995, p. 76) suggest that the wage
gap may be even higher in many developing countries.
In practice, these observed rural-urban wage gaps may not represent equi-
librium phenonomena of the kind envisaged by Todaro (1969) and Harris and
Todaro (1970), as discussed by Hatton and Williamson (1991). Furthermore, ob-
served wage gaps do not imply diﬀerent returns to workers of potentially identical
productivity, but could simply re￿ect diﬀerences in average skills across sectors.
In these circumstances testing for the presence of diﬀerentials is not straightfor-
ward, and it can often be argued that measured diﬀerentials re￿ect unobserved
characteristics (Magnac 1991). Interpreting the available evidence is also made
more complicated by the role of urban amenities, and spatial variation in the cost
of living. Overall, however, it is clear that assuming an urban unemployment
rate of 30% implies equilibrium wage gaps that are not implausibly high.
165 Calibration results
In this section, I will use the results of section 3 to calibrate the model described
in section 2. The basic idea is to combine an assumption about urban unemploy-
ment (u) with data on agricultural output and employment shares, under the
assumption that the observed data correspond to a Harris-Todaro economy. I
can then infer the nature of the ￿rst-best economy and compare it with the dual
economy. The aim will be to examine the eﬀects of dualism on aggregate output,
sectoral output, sectoral structure, wages and rental rates, and the distribution
of factor income.
As argued in section 2, greater understanding of the diﬀerences between
Harris-Todaro and the ￿r s t - b e s tc a nb ea c h i e v e db yt h i n k i n go ft h em o v e m e n t
b e t w e e nt h e ma si nt w os t a g e s .I nm o v i n ga w a yf r o mH a r r i s - T o d a r o ,w ec a n￿rst
consider a movement to an intermediate economy in which the wage diﬀerential
has been eliminated but total employment is held constant at the Harris-Todaro
level. Secondly, we then complete the move to the ￿rst-best by eliminating
unemployment. The results below will follow this decomposition, and it requires
o n l yaf e ws i m p l ec h a n g e st ot h ea l g e b r ao fs e c t i o n3t oa n a l y z et h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
of the intermediate economy.
I ￿rst consider results for the Cobb-Douglas case, presented in Table 2.6 The
table shows the eﬀects of eliminating a wage ratio of about 1.4, holding total
employment constant. There is one column for each region. The top two rows
show the sectoral labor shares implied by combining the agricultural output
and employment shares with the assumption that the aggregate labor share
η =0 .5. These labor shares are quite similar across regions, consistent with
technology parameters that are similar across regions. The large diﬀerences in
capital intensity across sectors will be discussed later in the paper.
The next six rows reveal the changes in sectoral structure in moving from a
dual economy to an intermediate economy with the wage diﬀerential eliminated
but employment held constant. The two equilibria can be compared in terms of
agricultural employment shares (a and b), output shares (s and r) and sectoral
capital allocations (x and z). The table also shows the ratio of modern sector
employment in the intermediate economy to that in the dual economy.
The next section of the table reports the ratio of modern sector wages in
the intermediate economy, to those in the dual economy; the corresponding
ratio for agricultural wages; and the ratio of rental rates. The last row of this
section reports the labor share in the intermediate economy. Finally, the fourth
6All calculations were carried out by computer programs written by the author, using the
mathematical software Maple.
17section of the table reports the ratio of modern sector output in the intermediate
economy to that in the dualistic one; the corresponding ratio for agricultural
output; and perhaps of especial interest, the change in total output.
Table 2
Eliminating the wage diﬀerential (σ = 1, η =0 .5, u =0 .30)
Variable Region Africa East Asia Latin America
1. Sectoral labor shares
ηm Modern sector 0.20 0.27 0.36
ηa Agricultural sector 0.80 0.93 0.83
2. Sectoral structure
a Old employment share 0.80 0.65 0.50
b New employment share 0.75 0.54 0.16
s Old output share 0.50 0.35 0.30
r New output share 0.42 0.25 0.08
x Old capital allocation 0.20 0.05 0.10
z New capital allocation 0.160 . 0 3 0 . 0 2
L0
m/Lm N e w / o l dm o d e r ne m p l o y m e n t 1.26 1.32 1.67
3. Factor payments
w0
m/wm New modern wage/old 0.68 0.69 0.67
w0
a/wa New agricultural wage/old 0.98 0.99 0.96
r
0
/r New rental rate/old 1.10 1.15 1.25
φ New aggregate labor share 0.45 0.44 0.39
4. Output changes
Y 0
m/Ym New modern output/old 1.16 1.17 1.36
Y 0
a/Ya New agricultural output/old 0.86 0.73 0.27
Y 0/Y New total output/old 1.011 .02 1.03
Notes
The output and employment shares are those of agriculture, as is the capital
allocation. ￿Old￿ corresponds to the Harris-Todaro economy, and ￿New￿ to an
intermediate economy with the same total employment but no wage diﬀerential.
Some of the most interesting results are those in section 3 of the table, which
show how factor payments change when the wage diﬀerential is eliminated. It
can be seen that wages are lower in both sectors in the absence of the diﬀerential.
It may appear surprising that the wage falls in agriculture, but as noted earlier,
this result has been derived in the trade theory literature on exogenous wage
diﬀerentials with ￿xed commodity prices. Jones (1971, p. 442-443) shows that
if an increased premium is paid to labor in the sector where labor receives the
smaller distributive share (in the framework of this paper, if wm/wa increases
and ηm < ηa) this must raise the wage rate, relative to the return to capital,
18in both sectors. Furthermore, what Jones refers to as the ￿magni￿cation eﬀect￿
implies that the ￿real￿ return to labour or capital moves in the same direction
as the relative return. Hence in a model with exogenous wage diﬀerentials, the
elimination of dualism will be associated with lower wages in both sectors. It
should also be noted, however, that for the cases considered here the decline in
the agricultural wage is not substantial. This ￿nding nicely demonstrates how
calibrating the 2 x 2 model can shed direct light on the quantitative implications
of eﬀects identi￿ed by trade theorists.
The ￿nal section of the table indicates the output gains associated with the
elimination of the wage diﬀerential, holding total employment constant. It is
clear that these gains are very small, even though I am considering a case where
the modern sector wage is initially roughly 40% higher than that in agriculture.
The output gains typically associated with the elimination of a wage diﬀerential
may appear surprisingly low, but this result is fully consistent with a variety of
previous work using other approaches, notably that of Johnson (1966).
Now I consider the diﬀerence made to these ￿ndings by the increase in em-
ployment, in the second stage of the transition from dualism to the ￿rst-best.
Table 3 reports the overall ￿rst-best outcomes relative to the Harris-Todaro
economy. Considering section 2 of the table, the most interesting result here is
the large rise in modern sector employment in moving to the ￿rst-best. This is
driven by two forces: the contraction of the agricultural sector, and the elimi-
nation of unemployment. In the African and East Asian cases, modern sector
employment rises by more than two-thirds. In the Latin American case, it almost
doubles.
The ratios of factor payments in section 3 of the table are unchanged com-
pared with those in Table 2. This simply re￿ects a standard result in this form
of 2 x 2 trade model, namely that factor prices are independent of factor endow-
ments while the economy remains incompletely specialized.
The ￿nal section of the table indicates the output gains in moving from dual-
ism to the ￿rst-best. One point to note is that, compared with the intermediate
economy described in Table 2, modern sector output has fallen and agricultural
sector output has risen. This re￿ects the Rybczynski eﬀect at work, in the second
stage of the transition from the dual economy to the ￿rst-best. The reduction
in the capital-labor ratio, with employment increased and the capital stock un-
changed, leads to a fall in the output of the capital-intensive good and a rise in
the output of the labor-intensive good.
19Table 3
Overall results (σ = 1, η =0 .5, u =0 .30)
Variable Region Africa East Asia Latin America
1. Sectoral labor shares
ηm Modern sector 0.20 0.27 0.36
ηa Agricultural sector 0.80 0.93 0.83
2. Sectoral structure
a Old employment share 0.80 0.65 0.50
b New employment share 0.77 0.59 0.31
s Old output share 0.50 0.35 0.30
r New output share 0.45 0.30 0.16
x Old capital allocation 0.20 0.05 0.10
z New capital allocation 0.170 . 0 4 0 . 0 5
L0
m/Lm N e w / o l dm o d e r ne m p l o y m e n t 1.67 1.67 1.98
3. Factor payments
w0
m/wm New modern wage/old 0.68 0.69 0.67
w0
a/wa New agricultural wage/old 0.98 0.99 0.96
r
0
/r New rental rate/old 1.10 1.15 1.25
φ New aggregate labor share 0.47 0.46 0.43
4. Output changes
Y 0
m/Ym New modern output/old 1.14 1.16 1.32
Y 0
a/Ya New agricultural output/old 0.94 0.90 0.59
Y 0/Y New total output/old 1.04 1.07 1.10
Notes
The output and employment shares are those of agriculture, as is the capital
allocation. ￿Old￿ corresponds to the Harris-Todaro economy and ￿New￿ to the
￿rst-best.
One of the most important ￿ndings is that eliminating dualism, even in the
initial presence of substantial urban unemployment, raises total output per head
by around 10% at most. A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that most of this
output gain is driven by reduced unemployment rather than by the elimination
of the wage diﬀerential. Overall, the results suggest that the eﬀects of dualism
are felt more keenly in sectoral structure than in aggregate output. Section 6
will discuss the implications of this result.
Some of the properties noted here follow from the ￿other things equal￿ na-
ture of the comparison and, in particular, the decision to compare equilibria
while holding the capital stock ￿xed. Although this is the most natural starting
point, it does give rise to some counter-intuitive results. For example, with a
￿xed capital stock, the elimination of dualism is associated with a fall in labor
20p r o d u c t i v i t yo ft h ee m p l o y e di nb o t hs e c t o r s ,r e ￿ecting the fall in the aggregate
capital-labor ratio.7 This suggests that it would be useful to repeat these ex-
periments allowing the capital stock to be determined endogenously. However,
complications quickly arise, and these will be discussed in detail in section 6.
The two main ￿ndings, insigni￿cant output gains but potentially major sec-
toral shifts, are borne out by more general experiments based on CES production
functions. For brevity, I report only the case where agriculture accounts for 65%
of employment and 35% of output, which corresponds roughly to East Asia for
the early 1960s. As before, the urban unemployment rate is assumed to be 30%.
I consider three values for the elasticity of substitution: 0.5, 1.5 and 2.
T h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e4 . T h e r ea r et w om a i np o i n t st on o t e .
First, higher elasticities of substitution are associated with a larger change in
output, as one might expect given that diminishing returns will set in more
slowly. This pattern can be seen in section 4 of the table. The second main
point to note is that the extent of structural change is very sensititive to the
elasticity of substitution. With an elasticity of 0.5, there is only a small change
in employment shares and total modern sector employment. With an elasticity
of 2, the changes are dramatic.
The framework developed here can also be used to analyze the paradox noted
by Corden and Findlay (1975), namely that modern sector output may be greater
in the dual economy than in the ￿rst-best, despite the rigidity in the urban labor
market. Corden and Findlay showed that a suﬃcient condition for this would be
￿xed coeﬃcients in production in both sectors, combined with the assumption
that the modern sector is relatively capital intensive. They also noted that the
paradoxical result would still hold for a limited degree of technical substitution.
I have carried out experiments for the cases used above, based on a ￿typical￿
country for each of the three regional groupings. These experiments suggest
that σ has to be very low before the Corden-Findlay paradox emerges. In each
case, σ must be around 0.15 or below for the dual economy to be associated
with greater modern sector output than in the ￿rst-best. Many economists
would be unhappy with assuming an elasticity this low, at least at this level of
aggregation, which suggests that the Corden-Findlay paradox is perhaps best
seen as a theoretical curiosity.
7To see this, note that with Cobb-Douglas production functions, average products are a
multiple of marginal products (and hence wages). If wages fall in both sectors then so must
the average products of employed labor. Aggregate output can still rise, because more people
are employed, and aggregate total factor productivity has risen.
21Table 4
Results for CES production functions (η =0 .5, u =0 .30, a =0 .65, s =0 .35)
Variable Region σ =0 .5 σ = 1.5 σ =2
1. Sectoral labor shares
ηm Modern sector 0.27 0.27 0.27
ηa Agricultural sector 0.93 0.93 0.93
2. Sectoral structure
a Old employment share 0.65 0.65 0.65
b New employment share 0.69 0.45 0.24
s Old output share 0.35 0.35 0.35
r New output share 0.35 0.22 0.11
x Old capital allocation 0.05 0.05 0.05
z New capital allocation 0.05 0.03 0.01
L0
m/Lm N e w / o l dm o d e r ne m p l o y m e n t 1.28 2.24 3.12
3. Factor payments
w0
m/wm New modern wage/old 0.69 0.69 0.69
w0
a/wa New agricultural wage/old 0.99 0.99 0.99
r
0
/r New rental rate/old 1.13 1.17 1.20
φ New aggregate labor share 0.47 0.46 0.45
4. Output changes
Y 0
m/Ym New modern output/old 1.06 1.29 1.49
Y 0
a/Ya New agricultural output/old 1.05 0.68 0.35
Y 0/Y New total output/old 1.06 1.08 1.09
Notes
The output and employment shares are those of agriculture, as is the capital
allocation. ￿Old￿ corresponds to the Harris-Todaro economy and ￿New￿ to the
￿rst-best.
6 Further discussion
This section provides some further discussion of the results, and their possible
generality. I start with the results concerning overall output gains, and then
discuss the more noticeable eﬀects on sectoral structure. I also consider the
implications for policy, and in particular, whether or not dualism should be a
major concern.
We have seen that the output losses associated with wage diﬀerentials are
small. The framework above may even overstate the extent of marginal product
diﬀerentials. It is easy to show that if the unemployed receive at least some
income, perhaps in the informal sector, then the intersectoral disparity between
marginal products in the long-run migration equilibrium will be smaller for a
given urban unemployment rate.
22Are there any ways in which dualism could be associated with greater output
losses? The comparison of the Harris-Todaro and ￿rst-best economies in this
paper holds the capital stock ￿xed, and relaxing this assumption would tend
to be associated with larger output eﬀects. The most obvious way to make the
capital stock endogenous would be to open the economy to capital ￿ows, but
this is not straighforward. With the urban wage and goods prices assumed to be
￿xed, and the other assumptions retained, then specifying an exogenous rental
rate is unlikely to be consistent with a diversi￿ed equilibrium. One solution to
this would be to introduce a speci￿c factor in non-agriculture, but I leave this
to further work.8
It is also worth noting that greater output eﬀects might be found if the tech-
nology parameters took other values. Johnson (1966, p. 697) drew attention to
this issue for Cobb-Douglas production functions, based on plotting production
possibility frontiers for various cases. He found that the output losses associ-
ated with a wage diﬀerential are greater when the exponents in the two sectoral
production functions are similar across sectors.
In the calibration experiments undertaken here, the technology parameters
are some distance apart. One way to retain the same basic framework, but con-
sider alternative values for parameters, is to assume that a certain fraction of
agricultural output is not measured in the national accounts, perhaps because
it is produced for non-marketed domestic consumption. If a fraction † of agri-
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where s∗ is the ￿true￿ output share adjusted for mismeasurement. If half of
agricultural output is unmeasured († =0 .5) then the output share becomes 0.67
in the African case, 0.52 in the East Asian case, and 0.46 in the Latin American
case. In turn this implies that the technology parameters are closer together.
Calibrating the model for the Cobb-Douglas case, using these new values for
the technology parameters, results in larger output eﬀects, as suggested by the
informal geometric analysis in Johnson (1966). Nevertheless, the output gains
remain a relatively small fraction of GDP, with the possible exception of the
L a t i nA m e r i c a nc a s e .
Various other changes to the simple Harris-Todaro framework could also
be associated with higher output costs of dualism. For example, it could be
8Another solution would be to follow Yabuuchi (1993) in assuming that capital is sector-
speci￿c, and that only the agricultural sector is open to international capital ￿ows.
23argued that workers receive their average product in agriculture rather than
their marginal product, through household income sharing for example. Given
diminishing returns in agriculture then, for a given urban unemployment rate,
the diﬀerentials in marginal products across sectors will be greater.
Alternatively, workers may be risk averse. It is sometimes argued that ob-
served urban-rural wage gaps are larger than those implied by the simplest
version of the Todaro (1969) framework combined with observed urban unem-
ployment rates (for example, Rosenzweig 1988). If workers are risk averse, they
will require a greater wage premium for urban employment to compensate them
for the risk of being unemployed. This will be associated with a larger wage
diﬀerential, and hence the costs of dualism will typically be greater.
Overall, though, the main consequences of dualism appear to be for sectoral
structure rather than for output, as we saw in section 5. When the elasticity
of substitution in production is relatively high, the movement from the Harris-
Todaro economy to the ￿rst-best is associated with large shifts in sectoral struc-
ture, partly due to the elimination of the wage diﬀerential and the contraction
of agriculture, and partly due to the elimination of unemployment.
How general is this kind of result likely to be? The model adopted here
perhaps overstates the extent of structural change that is likely to be associated
with the ending of dualism. One reason is that capital may be sector-speci￿ci n
developing countries (Robinson 1989) and this will tend to limit the extent of sec-
toral shifts. I have experimented with the sector-speci￿c case for Cobb-Douglas
production functions, using results derived in Appendix 2. These experiments
tend to suggest that sectoral shifts are indeed moderated under sector-speci￿c
capital, although only for the Latin American case are the diﬀerences marked.9
The total output gains are very similar in magnitude.
Another extension to the work above would be to incorporate a role for
non-traded goods. Relative price changes would then probably limit the extent
of structural diﬀerences between the dualistic economy and the ￿rst-best. The
simplest way to study this issue is to assume that the proportions of income
spent on each good are ￿xed, within an economy that is closed to international
trade. This involves some extensions to the algebra of section 3, and in particular
the introduction of a price index. In carrying out this extension I have found,
not surprisingly, that the introduction of constant budget shares implies that
employment shares are very similar across the dualistic and ￿rst-best economies.
Perhaps more interestingly, the magnitude of the output losses appears to be
9T h i sc a nb ei n f e r r e df r o mT a b l e s3a n d4 . N o t et h a tz, the share of capital allocated to
agriculture in the ￿rst-best, is often close to x, agriculture￿s share of capital in the Harris-
Todaro economy. Only in the Latin American case is there much diﬀerence.
24robust to this alternative assumption about price determination. In the case of
￿xed budget shares, the output costs of dualism are very similar to those in the
case of ￿xed prices, although slightly smaller.
I now turn to the potential implications of the paper￿s ￿ndings. It is often
thought that intersectoral mobility, and labor market ￿exibility in general, plays
a role in successful development and growth. For example, in the course of
a study of the Korean labor market, Kim and Topel (1995) suggest that the
￿implied mobility of the labor force [in Korea] may be a boon to development and
structural change￿. As a general proposition this may be true, but the results of
this paper suggest that the case for intersectoral mobility will sometimes have to
go beyond static eﬃciency considerations. It is certainly true that in the absence
of mobility, growth will usually be associated with a widening urban-rural wage
gap. Yet it turns out that the output loss associated with such a gap is typically
small, unless the labor market is so poorly integrated that the wage diﬀerential
becomes very large.
One argument that could be made is that the net present value of even a
small output loss may be very large. The relevance of this argument to policy
depends on the nature of the costs involved in eliminating dualism. If dualism
c a nb ee l i m i n a t e db yao n e - o ﬀ policy change, the point is a strong one, but many
of the proposals for moving to the ￿rst-best are based on policies that are likely
to involve substantial recurrent costs. Theoretical analysis of dual economies
has often focused on wage subsidies as a solution, but in the likely absence of
lump sum taxes, raising the revenue for such subsidies will involve deadweight
losses for the duration of the subsidy scheme.10
Overall, the case for eliminating dualism might have to be based on two other
considerations: the consequences of dualism for inequality, and interaction with
other imperfections or distortions. In the dual economy, the rural-urban wage
gap and urban unemployment both contribute to income inequality. The results
above show that there are also other distributional eﬀects at work. The elim-
ination of dualism is associated with a movement in factor shares that usually
works in favour of capital.11
The most important costs of dualism may arise if wage diﬀerentials interact
with other imperfections and distortions to generate much more signi￿cant wel-
fare losses. The example Williamson (1987, 1989) emphasizes is the interaction
with capital market failure. Say that the modern sector must ￿nance most of its
10On wage subsidies in the Harris-Todaro model, see Basu (1980), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1974), Corden and Findlay (1975) and Ray (1998, p. 382-388).
11In the cross-country data, dualism is associated with greater inequality. See Bourguignon
and Morrisson (1998).
25investment from its own pro￿ts. As a result, anything which constrains the size
of the modern sector will tend to be associated with a lower capital stock and
lower labor productivity. More generally, Fishlow and David (1961) established
that the joint impact of imperfections in the capital and labor market may be
deadweight losses that are rather more signi￿cant than those arising from im-
perfections in one market alone. Finally, however, note that when a diﬀerential
in rental rates is present in the 2 x 2 Harris-Todaro model, a reduction in the
minimum wage has an ambiguous eﬀect on aggregate output (Khan and Naqvi
1983).12
Perhaps the most important reason for concern about dualism is that there
could be signi￿cant externalities in the modern sector. These could be associated
with, for example, the bene￿cial eﬀects of learning-by-doing or agglomeration.
As we saw above, the elimination of dualism can be associated with dramatic
changes in sectoral structure, especially if the elasticity of substitution in pro-
duction is high. In the presence of sector-speci￿c externalities, these changes
in sectoral structure could have signi￿cant consequences for welfare, and the
presence of dualism would then be a major policy concern. Some of the rele-
vant issues are discussed in Graham and Temple (2001) ,w h oc a l i b r a t eam o d e l
of a dual economy with a sector-speci￿c externality that gives rise to multiple
equilibria.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has sought to quantify the costs of dualism. The paper ￿rst shows
how to calibrate a two-sector general equilibrium model of production using
readily available data on sectoral output and employment shares. Using results
introduced here, it is straightforward to recover technology parameters and the
intersectoral capital allocation from the available data. This approach may have
wider application, especially to the study of structural change and growth.
The particular calibration exercise I pursue is based upon the extension of
the Harris-Todaro model by Corden and Findlay (1975), and provides some
insight into the consequences of dualism for aggregate output, factor returns,
factor shares and sectoral structure. There are three main ￿ndings. First, the
elimination of dualism is not associated with particularly large output gains,
even when one starts from a position of urban unemployment. Second, the
movement to the ￿rst-best is associated with slightly lower wages in agriculture.
12A reduction in the rental diﬀerential will always raise aggregate output in the 2 x 2 model.
This is not the case, however, in a model with a role for land in the agricultural production
function. See Chao and Yu (1992).
26Rental rates rise, and the distribution of factor income shifts against labor.
The third and perhaps most interesting ￿nding is that the elimination of
dualism can give rise to large changes in sectoral structure. The novel implication
is that a failure to industrialize could have its origin in the labor market. An
interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the generality of
this claim, perhaps based on computable general equilibrium models that include
a role for non-traded goods, and a more detailed speci￿cation of labor market
rigidities and imperfections.
The paper also casts light on the eﬀects of minimum wage legislation or
other forms of wage ￿oor, when coverage is incomplete. As noted earlier, we can
interpret the agricultural sector as one uncovered by minimum wages, and the
urban sector as covered. The paper analyzes a case where the minimum wage
generates a 30% unemployment rate in the covered sector. Despite unemploy-
ment of this extent, the eﬀects of such legislation on aggregate output and wages
in the uncovered sector are generally found to be small for the cases considered
here. The minimum wage does succeed in redistributing income towards labor,
however.
8A p p e n d i x 1
This appendix describes the calibration technique for the version of the model
with CES production functions in both sectors. Once again the labor shares
in the two sectors in the dual economy, ηa and ηm, can be recovered using
equations (12) and (14). We can then use these equations to recover the share
of agricultural capital in total capital, x = Ka/K. Start by noting that under
intersectoral capital mobility, where r is the rental rate:











=( 1 − η)
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which de￿nes x in terms of two observable variables (a and s)a n dt h ea g -
gregate labor share η. The rest of the solution procedure aims to establish
two simultaneous equations in two unknowns, the ￿rst-best agricultural employ-
ment share b = L0
a/L and the ￿rst-best share of capital allocated to agriculture,
z = K0
a/K.
27The distribution parameters δa and δm are assumed to be unobserved, and
must be recovered from the data. Using the equation for the labor share in
agriculture (ηa = waLa/Ya) and assuming that labor in agriculture is paid its
marginal product, the following equation can be derived:
δa =
1 − ηa





A corresponding equation holds for δm:
δm =
1 − ηm





(An equivalent equation was derived by Klump and Preissler, 2000, p. 45).





























































Now turn to the equations for the ￿rst-best economy, where b = L0
a/L is the
proportion of employment in agriculture, r = Y 0
a/Y is the share of agriculture in
output and z = K0




m are output, capital and labor in manufacturing respectively. Let the
share of labor in national income in the ￿rst-best be φ,a n dt h es h a r e so fl a b o r
income in agricultural and manufacturing income be φa and φm respectively.

















We can now start to derive two simultaneous equations in terms of b, z
a n do b s e r v a b l ev a r i a b l e s ,w h i c hc a nt h e nb es o l v e df o rt h e￿rst-best allocation
28of employment b and capital z. The simplest way to derive the ￿rst simulta-
neous equation is to divide the expressions for the marginal products in the
Harris-Todaro economy by those in the ￿rst-best economy. In the case of labor￿s
























































To derive the second simultaneous equation, note that as before, we have











The equations corresponding to (30) and (31) are the same in form, with the
appropriate change of symbols:
δa =
1 − φa
















Now we make use of the fact that the distribution parameters δa and δm
a r ea s p e c t so ft h ep r o d u c t i o nt e c h n o l o g i e s ,a n ds oa r et h es a m ef o rt h eH a r r i s -
Todaro and the ￿rst-best economies. Equating (30) to (39), and (31)t o( 4 0 ) ,
































































29Now we need to eliminate the unobservable variable r. If we combine equa-



























































Equations (36) and (45) can be solved numerically to obtain b and z.
The remaining results are computed as follows. To calculate the output ratio
across the two economies, ￿rst note that the equality of wages with marginal
products for CES production functions implies the following modern sector labor
share for the Harris-Todaro economy:







and for the ￿rst-best:























































































The only additional information this requires is the solution for (42) which
can be calculated using the solutions for b and z.F i n a l l y ,n o t et h a tw ec a na l s o

















where the second equality follows from equations (46) and (47). Corre-
sponding expressions can easily be derived for the ratios of agricultural wages
and rental rates across the two economies.
309A p p e n d i x 2
This appendix describes simple modi￿cations to the Cobb-Douglas results of
section 3 that apply when capital is sector-speci￿c, rather than mobile between
sectors. We can consider this case by setting z = x.T h e nt h e￿rst-best agricul-








(1 − u)1−θ = 1 (48)
Given a, u, α and θ this equation can be solved for bSS numerically. We
can also ￿nd the eﬀects of dualism on aggregate output when capital is sector-
speci￿c . U s i n ge q u a t i o n( 2 4 )i nt h em a i nt e x ta n ds u b s t i t u t i n gi nt h eC o b b -
Douglas production functions for Ym and Y 0























Other results follow in a straightforward way.
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3410 Notes for referees
The derivations reported in the text are based on some tedious algebra. For
convenience, the notes below ￿ll in some of the missing steps.
Since the process of checking the algebra is an arduous one, it may be worth
stating that I am reasonably con￿dent that the expressions given in the text are
correct, for no fewer than four reasons beyond the usual revisits to the algebra.
Several of thepoints belowcan becon￿rmed by referring to the attached printout
of the Maple computer program I have written for the Cobb-Douglas case; the
more complex programs for the CES case are available immediately on request.
1. Whenever the model is calibrated, I use the results together with the
production functions to calculate the marginal products of capital and labour
in both the Harris-Todaro and the ￿rst-best economies: I then check that the
marginal products are related in the appropriate way (for instance, they should
be equal in the ￿rst-best). In the computer program, this corresponds to check-
ing that wdiﬀ=0, wdiﬀ2=0 and rdiﬀ=0. This version of the software does not
check the equality of rental rates under dualism, but that is easily done (and
has been).
2. When the model is calibrated I also check that the sum of the values
of the marginal products times the input quantities is equal to nominal output
(i.e. I check the value added identity) where total nominal output is found by
summing the nominal outputs of the two sectors. Various other consistency
checks have been implemented in developing the software - some of these can
be seen in the computer printout. Note that the program provided checks that
various components sum to zero; in earlier and longer versions of the software, I
have checked that the relevant individual components sum to zero (for example,
x-x2 should equal zero, outfac2-outfac=0 etc.).
3. The results from the calibration exercise are in agreement throughout
with the relevant trade theory, as discussed at greater length in the main text.
4. The calibration results found for the Cobb-Douglas case (elasticity of
substitution equal to one) are almost exactly identical to those found for the
C E Sc a s ew i t ha ne l a s t i c i t yo fs u b s t i t u t i o no f1.0001. Since the algebra for the
two cases is derived almost completely independently, and both derivations give
the same answers for this value of the elasticity of subsitution, this tends to
reinforce my belief that these lengthy derivations are correct.
3510.1 Derivation of (23)













































Note that the denominator is equal to:
θ − α
θ(1 − α)














































































w h i c hi se q u a t i o n( 2 3 )i nt h et e x t .
10.2 Derivation of (30)
Agricultural labor is paid its marginal product, so with a CES function this
implies:



























































+ ηa(1 − δa)=( 1 − δa)
δa
ˆ





= 1 − ηa
δa =
1 − ηa ￿





10.3 Derivation of labor shares ready for (43):

























From (39) we have:
δa =
1 − φa
















= 1 − φa
φa
"







= 1 − δa
φa =
1 − δa •









































Simplifying and using the expressions in the text for ηa and 1 − ηa given
by equations (12) and (28) ultimately yields the equation in the text. Similar
calculations give the equation in the text for φm.
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